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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
SOREN J. JESPERSEN, ROY H. 
EAST, HOWARD J. HASSELL 
and ROY W. BROWN, doing busi-
ness as POWER ENGINEERING 
COMPANY, a partnership, 
Plaintiffs and Resp10ndents, 
-vs.-
DESERET NEWS PUBLISHING 
CO~IP ANY, a corporation, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Case No. 
85281 
Appellant's Brief 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This suit was brought by the Plaintiffs against the 
Defendant to recover under the terms of a written lease 
for damages to a building and payment of rent. The 
complaint is in the usual form but in two counts. 
In the first count the Plaintiffs seek damages to the 
floor in the building which collapsed during its occupancy 
by the Defendant. In the second count the Plaintiffs 
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seek recovery of the rent for the unexpired term of 
the lease after the Defendant abandoned the building 
following the collapse of the floor. 
The Court, sitting without a jury awarded judg-
ment for damages to the building in the first cause of 
action in the sum of $3,000.00 and for rent for the 
unexpired term of the lease in the sum of $2,025.00 and 
for $500.00 attorney fees and costs. 
ADMITTED FACTS 
Defendant leased from Plaintiffs the West 145 
feet of a building known as Building No. 181, located 
at 1710 South Redwood Road. The lease provides for a 
term of 12 months, the rental for that period to be 
$2,700.00 payable at the rate of $225.00 per month. The 
term commenced on the 23rd day of August, 1948. It 
is to be noted that there is no leasing of land, but there 
is only a lease of a ,portion of the building. This fact 
is important. In addition to the usual ·provisions in the 
lease it provided, "that the said lessee further agrees 
to deliver up said premises to said lessors at the ex-
piration of said term in as good order and condition 
as when the same was entered upon by said lessee, 
reasonable use and wear thereof and damage by the 
elements excepted. '' 
Negotiations for the lease were commenced on Fri-
day, August 20, 1948, at which time an agent of the 
Defendant telephoned the Plaintiff East and inquired 
about renting warehouse space. (Tr. 107-108). During. 
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the negotiations on this day, and subsequently, a full 
disclosure was made by the Defenda~t of the purpose 
for which the warehouse was to be rented. (Tr. 109). 
The Plaintiff, East, conducted these negotiations for 
the Plaintiff partnership. This storage space was needed 
innnediately because of the fact that 15 railroad cars 
were being held up until the newsprint which they con-
tained could be unloaded. Over the weekend, between 
the 20th of August and the 23rd of August, it was 
necessary for the Plaintiffs to remove a number of 
partitions which were in that portion of the building 
the Defendant was going to lease. (Tr. 110). The 
Plaintiffs were fully informed of the weight and size 
of the rolls of newsprint which were to be stored. (Tr. 
112). The Plaintiffs were informed of the manner in 
which these rolls were to be stacked. These rolls of 
newsprint had a dian1eter of 38 inches and were of four 
sizes. The 66 inch rolls weighed approximately 1600 
pounds each, the 49lj2 inch rolls weighed approximately 
1200 pounds each, the 33 inch, approximately 800 pounds 
each, and the 30 inch, approximately 650 ·pounds each. 
(Tr. 114). 
The Plaintiff East was in and about the prem1ses 
during the time that the railroad cars were being un-
loaded and the newsprint stored in the building. This 
operation commenced August 23rd and took approxi-
mately three or four days. (Tr. 120). 
The flooring sustained the load of this newsprint 
t:.ntil Sunday, forenoon the 19th day of September, 1948 
"!1ich was the date on which the flooring in the South-
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west portion of the building collapsed. (Tr. 145). The 
weather report which was introduced without objection 
showed 43j100 of an inch of rain had fallen the Satur-
day afternoon and Sunday morning. (Exhibit 6). 
Defendant's agents were concerned about the suf-
ficiency of the floor to hold the weight of these rolls of 
newsprint. Mr. East stated that the floor was of suffi-
cient strength to hold this newsprint. The Defendant•s 
agents stated that he assured them on a number of 
occasions that the floor was of sufficient strength to 
withstand the load of these rolls. (Tr. 205) As a matter of 
fact, the Plaintiff East conceded that in the portion of the 
building retained by Plaintiffs, they had stacked some 
sort of bricks, and had loaded the floor to the extent 
of Five or Six hundred ·pounds per square foot, (Tr. 
206), a weight very much in excess of the load placed 
upon the floor in Defendant's portion of the building. 
It is uncontradicted that in this case that the 
building was erected during war years for a temporary 
purpose and that a poor grade of material was used in 
its construction. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS UPON WHICH AP-
PELLANT INTENDS TO RELY FOR THE REVER-
SAL OF THE JUDGMENT MADE AND GIYEX 
HEREIN. 
I. 
That the evidence is insufficient to support finding 
No. 3 to the effect that Defendant stored certa~n ma-
terials therein in such amounts and in such a manner 
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that Defendant broke said floor and sub-flooring or 
caused said floor to be broken and smashed, said pilings 
to be driven downward and out of line and the walls 
of said building to be broken and pushed out of line. 
II. 
That the e\Tidence is insufficient to support findings 
X o. 4 and 5 to the effect that said damages were in 
excess of the reasonable use and wear of said premises 
or damages by the elements and that reasonable cost 
of restoring said building to its former good order and 
condition is the sum of $3,000.00. 
III. 
That the evidence is insufficient to support finding 
~o. 7 to the effect that Plaintiff is entitled to recover 
the sum of $2,025.00 as rental for the reason that the 
destruction of said building terminated the relationship 
of landlord and tenant between Plaintiff and Defendant. 
ARGUMENT 
The Three points on which Defendant relies are 
so interrelated that they may be properly discussed 
under two heads. The lease provides that the building 
must be delivered up to said lessors at the expiration 
~ f the term in as good order and condition as t1w same 
was entered upon by said lessee, ''reasonable use ann 
,year thereof and damage by the elements excepted.'' 
It is the contention of the Defendant that the 
tlamages to the building was the result of either or both 
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and that the Defendant was relieved of any liability 
for the damages to the building and further that the 
building was rendered untenantable by reason thereof 
without the fault of the Defendant and thereby was 
relieved of paying any further rent. 
One of the main issues of fact in this case was 'the 
cause of the collapse of the flooring of the building. It. 
is the contention of the defendant that under the above 
quoted covenant of the lease, it makes no difference 
whether the collapse of the floor was caused by over-
loading it or whether the floor collapsed because of 
the action of the elements. If the collapse was due to 
overload, it nevertheless was within the contemplation 
of the parties, caused by reasonable use and wear. H 
such is the case, there is no liability under the said 
covenant contained in the lease. On the other hand, 
if the collapse was due to the action of the elements, 
then and in such evidence, the defendant would be re-
lieved from liability by reason of said covenant. 
REASONABLE USE 
This is a contract action, and as will be shown by 
the authorities hereinafter cited, the meaning of the 
phrase "reasonable use and wear," must be given the 
meaning contemplated or intended by the parties. It 
can readily be seen that the phrase "reasonable use 
and wear" would have an entirely different meaning if 
the portion of the warehouse rented was to be used fot 
an office than it would if such portion was to be u~ed 
for the storing of heavy merchandise, such as newsprin~. 
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"~ e subn1it that the building wa~ used for the very 
purpose contemplated by both parties to this agreement. 
On cross examination, the plaintiff East admitted that 
he knew of the manner in which this newsprint was to 
be stored and he knew the weight and size of the rolls 
and the manner in which it \Vas to be stacked. (Tr. 215 }. 
He not only was informed of these matters before the 
storing of the news·print commenced, but he was in and 
about the building at all times that the defendant'3 
agents were unloading and storing this newsprint and 
saw the manner in which it was being stored. (Tr. 205). 
On cross examination, he stated that he thought that 
the floor was sufficient to hold the newsprint, and that 
he made no objection at any time during the process of 
storing the newsprint. l-Ie conceded in so many words 
that he believed the use to which the building was being 
put was a reasonable and proper use. He conceded 
that in that portion of the building retained by plain-
tiffs, (Tr. 207), they had loaded the floor to an even 
greater weight per square foot. Of course, the defend-
ant, through its agent, also believed that this use was 
a reasonable and proper use. 
We therefore submit that it is established in this 
case that the collapse of the flooring was due to "reason-
able use and wear", as contemplated by the parties in 
making this use of the building. We believe that this 
issue is one of fact and also one of law. The authorities 
will be hereinafter cited. 
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DA~1:AGE BY THE ELEMENTS 
Plaintiff in this action is suing the defendant for 
a breach of the above quoted ·provision of the lease 
contending that· the premises were not delivered up in 
as good order and condition as when the same were 
entered upon by the defendant, ''reasonable use and 
wear thereof and damage by the elements excepted." 
Plaintiffs have the burden of proving by a preponder-
ance of the evidence that this covenant was breached. 
Plaintiffs' experts testified that the sole cause of 
the collapse was the overload. (Tr. 80). As above 
pointed out, even if this were so, defendant still did 
not breach this covenant. However, we believe that 
the plaintiff has failed in its burden of proof and that 
as a matter of fact and under all of the circumstances, 
the most reasonable conclusion is that the cause of the 
collapse was due to "damage by the elements." 
The newsprint was loaded upon the flooring of the 
building commencing August 23. The flooring sustained 
theload of this newHprint until the 19th day of Septem-
ber, 1948, which was the date on which the flooring jn 
the Southwest portion of the building collapsed. The 
exhibit from the weather department shows that during 
Saturday afternoon and night and Sunday morning, 
• there was a very heavy rai~ fall. This rain fall \YP.:-' 
unusual for this part of the country. r:ehe testimolly 
further disclosed that the ground was at such a I eve I 
that the water would accumulate in this Southwest 
section of the building and in and around the two rows 
of pilings identified as rows "B" and "C" in the testi-
8 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
mony. ~lr. 'Vyeoff, who handled the storing of the 
newsprint for the defendant, examined the flooring on 
~[onday. Septe1nber 20. (Tr. 128). In making the ex-
amination he got down into the collapsed section of the 
flooring, examined the ground at that point and looked 
in under the flooring which had not collapsed. He testi-
fied that there was an accumulation of water in this 
Southwest section of the building and that in looking 
in under the other portions of the building, the ground 
appeared to be dry. He was able to push a stick into the 
ground near one of the footings a distance of 2 feet. 
(Tr. 147). This disclosed the nature of the soil and the 
fact that it was of such a nature that it would readily 
permit the footings to sink. Mr. Ulrich, an ex,pert wit-
ness called by the defendant, testified that in his opinion, 
the cause of the collapse was due to the sinking of one 
or more of these footings, causing a heavier load to be 
placed on the joists supported thereby. and causing the 
floor to collapse. (Tr. 146-168). It is true that the plain-
tiff Jespersen stated that there was no water under 
this portion of the building, but he based his conclusion 
upon the fact that he saw no damage to the newsprint 
and from an observation he took from the outside of 
the building, we submit that Mr. Wycoff was in by far 
the better position to observe the conditions of this part 
of the building. 
Then too, there is the fact that the other flooring 
in the building did not collapse, although loaded to the 
same extent as the flooring in the Southwest ·portion 
of the building. If there had been no weight upon the 
floor of any kind, ~f course there would have been no 
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collapse of the floor. There had to be weight upon this 
floor for there to have been a collapse. But· without 
the water condition and the resultant weakening of the 
soil and sinking of the footing or footings there would 
have been no collapse. The floor was subjected to the 
strain of a 20 foot span instead of the 10 foot span 
under which it had been constructed. 
THE FLOOR WAS NOT OVERLOADED 
As to whether or not there was an overload placed 
upon this floor, the evidence is in direct conflict as 
above indicated. Even if it were overloaded, no liability 
could be visited upon the defendant and therefore this 
issue is really immaterial in this case. 
Naturally, we believe that t,he testimony of .l\lr. 
Ulrich should be followed, and it appears to be the most 
reasonable. The floor had withstood this "\Veight for 
approximately 26 days and only after the severe rain 
and the collection of water under this portion of the 
building did ·the floor fall. The rest of the flooring re-
mained, other than this collapsed section which con-
tinued to sustain the same weight which had been 
placed upon it. 
We believe that Mr. Ulrich, due to his experience 
and training was better qualified than any other expert 
at· the trial. The experts testified to certain formulas 
and arrived at different results in connection with the 
strength of this floor. It is difficult upon just the 
looking at the formula and considering the answers of 
10 
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each expert to arrive at a conclusion as to which should 
be followed. But we believe that the surrounding cir-
cum~tanre~ just above ~et forth tend to bear out the 
testimony and condusions reached by 1Ir. Ulrirh. Here 
again, the burden of proof is upon plaintiffs to show 
by the preponderance of the evidence the cause of the 
collapse of the floor. 
DEFENDANT IS NOT LIABLE FOR RENT 
There is a general rule of the common law that 
the liability of the tenant for rent is not affected by 
the fact that buildings or improvements on the land 
leased are wholly or partially destroyed by some un-
foreseen casualty. In s,pite of this general rule, how-
eYer, upon two grounds, we believe that this rule is not 
applicable to the case at bar. The first reason is that 
this old common law rule is outmoded, is harsh and 
~e",'ere, and is not one which is applicable to present 
<lay conditions. The second reason is that there is a 
well established exception to this common law rule 
recognized in the United States where the lease is not 
of the land, but is of a portion of a building . 
• THE CO~LMON LAW RULE SHOULD NOT BE 
ADOPTED 
Section 88-2-1, Utah Code Annotated, 1943, pro-
,·ides in part so far as material here as follows: 
"The common law of England * * * so far 
only as it is consistent with and ,adapted to the 
natural and physical conditions of this state and 
11 
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the necessities of the people thereof, is hereby 
adopted and shall be the rule of decision in all 
courts of this state." 
The common law rule contended for by the plain-
tiffs which visits upon a tenant's liability for rent where 
the subject matter of the lease is substantially de-
stroyed does not. come or certainly is not constant with 
or adapted to present day conditions in this State, and 
the necessities of the ·people. It has been severely 
criticized by many courts. 
In Whitaker v .. Hawley, 25 Kan. 674, 26 Pacific 
States Reports 471, 37 Am. Rep. 277, Judge Brewer, 
who subsequently became a Justice of the Supreme 
Court of the United States, severely criticized this 
ruling. (This criticism is not found in the case as re-
ported in the American Reporters Citation, but is con-
tained in the Pacific States Reports, which may be found 
in our County Law Library). In this case, Justice 
Brewer points out that this rule is a hold over from 
feudal times, and is not in accord with modern day con-
ditions. In this case he quotes from Gates v. Green, 4 
Page 354, as follows : 
"It appears to be a principle of natural law 
that a tenant who rents a house or other tene-
ment for a short period, and with a view to rio 
other benefit except that which may be derived 
from its actual use, should not be compelled to 
·pay rent any longer than the tenement is capable 
of being used.'' 
In Scott Brothers v. Flood's Trustee, Ky. 99 S.\Y. 
967, the court referred to the common law rule which 
12 
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had been changed by statute in l{entucky as being a 
'·harsh and unreasonable rule of the common law,'' and 
that such rule "'in1posed upon him (tenant) an un-
reasonable burden.'' 
The common law rule was further criticized by the 
court in Taylor v. Hart, 73 Miss. 22, 18 So. 546, 30 L.R.A. 
716, wherein the court referred to the opinion in Whit-
aker v. Hawley, supra, in the following language: 
"* * * in an opinion of great learning and 
power, exposing the absurdities of the common 
law rule on this general subject as especially 
applied to the condition of society existing with 
us.'' 
Perhaps the leading case which refused to follow 
the common la\v rule is the case of Wattles v. So. Omaha 
Ice and Coal Company, 15 Neb. 251, 69 N.vV. 785, 36 
L.R.A. 424, 61 Am. St. Rep. 554. In that case, the 
plaintiff leased to the defendant certain land and build-
ings wherein the defendant stored ice. After the de-
fendant had entered ·possession, the buildings were de-
stroyed and rendered entirely valueless. Plaintiff in 
this action sought to recover the rent reserve in the 
lease accrued subsequently to the destruction of the 
buildings. The court repudiated the common law rule 
and held that the defendant was not liable for the rent. 
'Ve will take the liberty of quoting at length from this 
case because it is the best expression we have been able 
to find refusing to follow the common law rule. The 
conclusion of court is stated as follows: 
"We reach the conclusion that the common 
law rule of construction under consideration is 
13 
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not in force in this state, and formulate the rule 
as follows: Where a substantial portion of leased 
premises is destroyed without the fault of the 
lessee, he is entitled to an apportionment of the 
rent covenanted to he paid and accruing there-
after, in the absence of an express assumption by 
him of the risk of such destruction.'' 
In reaching this conclusion, the court stated: 
''By the lease under consideration, the 
premises were let to the lessee for a specified 
term, in consideration of which he covenanted to 
pay to the lessor a specific sum as rent, payable~ 
in installments, on certain dates during the term. 
The lease contained no provision binding the 
lessor to rebuild. The lease contained no provi-
sion for any abatement of the rent promised for 
any reason whatsoever. The question presented 
is: A substantial part of the leased premises 
having been destroyed ·without the fault of 
either lessor or lessee, is the latter entitled to an 
apportionment of the rent accruing thereafter? 
The common-law construction of such a covenant 
as this would not relieve the tenant from pay-
ment of the entire rent reserved." 
In further discussing this rule, the court stated: 
"This rule has often been assailed as utterly 
repugnant to justice and reason * * * and so 
harsh was the operation of the rule that in many 
states * * * statutes have been passed for the 
purpose of modifying or abrogating it." 
''The clear tendency of all the n1odern deci-
sions, in our states, has been to modify the rule 
of the common law as to work out a result just 
and equitable in the situation." 
14 
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Quoting from another case, the court stated: 
'• The clear tendency of the rulings has been 
to do away with the common law technicalities 
concerning real estate, and to bring the rules of 
the common law more in harmony with those re-
specting ·personal property and that the distinc-
tions growing out of the feudal system are dis-
appearing, and this distinction between the lease 
of real property and the hiring of chattels is one 
which sooner or later will cease to exist.'' 
The court then discusses the old English case, Para-
dine v. Jane, Aleyn 26, which was the case considered 
to be the first one to expound the common law rule. 
Then the court discusses the establishment of the ex-
ception to the rule where the lease is of only a portion 
of a building, which exception was first announced in 
1832 in the case of Winton v. Cornish, 5 Ohio 477. In 
discussing this exception, the court stated: 
''Indeed, the exception to the rule seems to 
be about as well established in the United States 
as the rule itself. In some of the cases following 
the rule, the reasons for its existence are said 
to be that it is only equitable that the lesse~ 
should pay the entire rent, notwithstanding a de-
struction of the part of the leased premises, since 
the lessor must bear the loss of the destroyed 
property, and that the enforcement of the rule 
tends to diminish the carelessness and increase 
the vigilance of a lessee. We do not know what 
reason led to the formulation of this rule, but, if 
the one quoted above is the correct one, it is of 
no force at the present time, because the lessor 
may protect his interest in the property while in 
the hands of the lessee by insurance. The reason 
given for the formulation of the exception to 
15 
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the rule is that by a lease of a room or basement 
in a building, no interest in the soil passes to the 
lessee, and that, when the basement or room is 
destroyed, the leased estate is gone, and the 
relation of landlord and tenant terminated. But 
it seems to us that another principle underlies 
and controls the exception, and that is this: that, 
the leased room or building having been destroyed 
without the fault of the lessee, the consideration 
for his promise to pay the rent accruing there-
after failed. The common-law rule announced in 
Paradine v. Jane is merely a rule of construction 
of a real-estate contract. 
We have already seen to· what extent the 
common law is in force in this state, and have 
noted the command of the legislature to the courts 
of this state, in construing real-estate contracts, 
to look to the subject-matter of the contract, the 
language employed by the contracting partie3, 
and to ascertain, if possible, and give effect to, 
the intention of the contracting parties. A lease 
for real estate is not a bargain and sale for a 
given time of the lessor's interest in the leased 
premises. It is rather a hiring or letting of prop-
erty for a certain time, and for a named consid-
eration; and, when a lessee covenants to pay rent 
for a term, the consideration for that covenant 
is his right to the use and occupancy of the thing 
leased. In the covenant of a lessee to pay at 
stated times certain sums of money for the rent 
-that is, for the privilege or the right to use and 
occupy the leased premises-is involved the con-
dition that such leased property shall be in 
existence, and be capable of being used and en-
joyed by the lessee. The promise to pay a stateu 
sum of money as rent for leased premises for a 
certain term is based upon the presumption that 
the leased premises shall exist for the terr:t. In 
the case at bar if the lessee had been evicted from 
16 
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part of the demised premises by the holder of a 
title paramount to that of the lessor's, the lessee 
would be entitled to an apportionment of the rent. 
Tayl. Landi. & rren. 387, and cases there cited. 
Under the exception established to the rule, 
had the entire leased premises been washed away 
by a flood, the relation of landlord and tenant 
existing between the parties to this suit would 
have from that moment ceased. This relation 
would not have been terminated by the act of the 
parties, but by operation of law; and the lessee 
would have been relieved from the payment of 
rent accruing thereafter, upon the principle that 
the consideration for his promise to pay such 
rent had failed. If we look to the subject-matter 
of the lease under consideration, and the langu-
age employed by the parties in making the con-
tract, we cannot say that either of these parties, 
at the time they made this lease, had in contem-
plation the fact that the leased premises, or any 
part thereof, might be destroyed by a hurricane. 
They did not contract with reference to such a 
casualty. To use the language of Th1:cKean, C. J ., 
in Pollard v. Shaffer, supra, had the lessor been 
asked at the time this lease was made," Is it your 
intention to hold the lessee liable for the entire 
rent reserved in case the leased buildings shall 
be destroyed by a cyclone~'' he doubtless would 
have answered that he had never considered that 
contingency. If the question had been asked the 
lessee whether it was his intention to pay the 
entire $6,000 rent even if one-half of the leased 
property should be destroyed before the expira-
tion of the term, it is very probable that he would 
have said that he had no such an intention. Yet, 
in construing this contract, we must, if possible, 
give effect to the intention of the parties, not-
\Yithstanding the common-law rule of construc-
tion. rro us it seems that the lessor, in effect, said 
17 
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to the les·see : ''I own this tract of land, and 
these ice houses. They are in good repair. T~ey 
are fit for the purposes of harvesting and storing 
ice. I will hire them to you for five years if you 
will pay me twelve hundred dollars per year, and 
keep the premises in good repair." To this the 
lessee assented. This was an offer and a promise 
upon the part of the lessor to furnish for the 
entire time the hired property. It was a promise 
and a covenant upon the part of the lessee to pay 
the monthly installments of rent for the right 
to use and occupy the hired property, if it existed. 
But it was not a proposition on the part of the 
lessor to quit-claim his right to the use and occu-
pancy of the leased premises to the lessee for five 
years, in consideration of $6,000 paid or to be 
paid by the latter." 
The court then continued its discussion of common 
law rule and stated: 
"This rule of construction of the common la1Y 
is a harsh and a technical one. \V e do not cer-
tainly know the conditions that existed when it 
was formulated, nor do we know in \vhat reasons 
it had its origin; but we do know that since the 
decision of Paradine v. Jane the conditions of 
the race have changed; its conscience and intellect 
have been quickened; and this rule, however 
meritorious it may have been at the time and 
place of its origin, is opposed to the genius and 
spirit of the present age, and in conflict with its 
judgment and conscience. In one or two instance~, 
in states where its effect has not been even 
limited by statute, its applicability to real-estate 
contracts in this country has been questioned. 
Such was the case of Ripley v. \Vightman, 4 Mc-
Cord, 447, where it was held that the fact that a 
house had been rendered untenantable by a hur-
18 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
ricane afforded the lessee a defense to the action 
for the rent. In Whitaker v. Hawley, 25 Kan. 674, 
the buildings upon the leased premises were 
wholly destroyed by fire, without the fault of the 
lessee, and the court held that, because of the 
accidental destruction by fire of the buildings 
upon the leased premises, the lessee was entitled 
to an apportionment of the rent. In that case, 
Brewer, J., speaking for the court, said: "And 
right here it may be remarked that a lease is, in 
one sense, a running, rather than a completed, 
contract. It is an agreement for a continuous 
interchange of values between landlord and ten-
ant, rather than a purchase single and completed 
of a term or estate in lands.'' We are aware 
that this case stands practically alone, and in a 
footnote to :Mc~Iillan v. Solomon, 94 Am. Dec. 
654, its isolation is pointed out with a remark by 
the editor that it is supported by "much charity 
and some logic." We approve of the opinion, be-
cause we think it is good law, as well as good 
sense. We approve of it also because it is a mag-
nificent protest against slavish devotion to anti-
quated rules; and we approve of it because it 
breathes the spirit of humanity and equity, and 
is based on a thought of the nineteenth century.'' 
Three judges desented from the opinion of the 
majority, but it is to be noted that the desenting 
judges only desented upon the ground that the tenant 
had not surrendered the premises, but had remained 
therein. 
The court, in Coogan v. Parker, 2 S.C. 255, 16 Arn. 
Rep. 659, also held that the common law rule was not 
applicable and stated the rule to be followed thusly: 
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''Unless something of importance has been 
overlooked in the foregoing citations, it cannot 
be doubted that, in case of substantial destruc-
tion of the subject matter of the lease, the tenant 
is entitled to descind." 
See also the quotation hereafter from Waite v. 
Oneil, 76 Fed. 408. 
We submit that the common law rule should not 
be followed in this state for the reasons stated by the 
foregoing authorities, and upon the grounds that it is 
not that type of common law rule which has been adopted 
in the jurisprudence of this state. But even though 
the court should not feel at liberty to repudiate this 
common law rule, there is an exception which has be-
come well established in the Untied States, and under 
which the case at bar is to be decided. 
EXCEPTION TO COMMON LAW RULE 
As pointed out above, the lease in the present case 
is not a lease of land, it is merely a lease of a portion 
of a building. We submit that under the well recog-
nized exception to the common law rule, a substantial 
destruction of this building for the purposes for which 
it was leased constitutes a defense to an· action for rent 
for that period of time after the collapse of the floor. 
Two reasons are given for the exception we conten.l 
is applicable to this case. The first reason is that where 
a portion only of a building is leased by implication, 
the parties intend that the subject matter of the lease 
shall have continued existence. This reason is exempli-
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fled by the following cases: Da·uis v. Shepperd, 196 Ark. 
30~, 117 S.,Y. 2d 337; TVhittaker v. Holmes, 165 Ark. 1, 
:263 S."'· 788; Saylor v. Brooks, (l~an.), 220 P. 193; 
Greenberg v. Sun Shipbuildiug Company, 277 Pa. 312, 
121 ~-\.. 63. 
The other reason giYen for this rule is that the 
subject matter having been substantially destroyed, the 
leased estate is gone and the relation of landlord and 
tenant terminated. This basis on the rule is exemplified 
by the following cases: TVomach v. McQttarry, 28 Ind. 
103, 92 Am. Dec. 306; Ainsworth v. Ritt, 38 Cal. 89; 
Graves v. Berdan, 26 N.Y. 493, 29 Barb. 100; Harrington 
V~ TVatson, 11 Or. 143, 3 Pacific 173, 50 Am. Rep. 465; 
Han v. Baker Lodge, 21 Or. 30, 27 Pacific 166, 13 L.R.A. 
158, :28 Am. St. Rep. 723; Shawmut v. Nat'l. Bank v. 
City of Boston, 118 :Mass. 125; Waite v. Oneil, 76 Fed. 
408. 
'V e will here discuss briefly some of the foregoing 
cases and make quotations therefrom. We will first 
consider the group. of cases basing the exception on the 
continued existence of the subject matter of the lease. 
Davis v. Shepperd, supra, was an action for rent 
of a store building which ·was destroyed by fire to such 
an extent that it could not be used for business pur-
poses. The lease was for a term of one year, the rent 
being payable six months in advance. The fire occurred 
two months after the second 6 month rent had become 
due. The court stated: 
"In 36 Corpus Juris under the title Landlord 
and Tenant, it is said that: 'At common law, a 
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lessee of premises which are accidently destroyed 
subsequent to the making of the lease cannot be 
relieved from an express covenant to pay rent 
unless he has stipulated in the lease for a cessa-
tion of the rent in such case, or the lessor has 
covenanted to rebuild.' 
''There is a well recognized exception to this 
general rule to the effect that where the perform-
ance depends on the continued existence of the 
building leased and the building is destroyed so 
that it cannot be used for the purposes for which 
it was leased, the consideration for the contract 
fails, and the lessee is no longer obligated to 
pay rent on the building. This exception to the 
general common law rule is recognized in the 
cases of Buerger v. Boyd, 25 Ark. 441 and Whit-
taker v. Holmes, 165 Ark. 1, 263, S.W. 788. 
"It is clear from the evidence in the instant 
case that the building was leased for the purpose 
of running a store and that purpose only, and 
that after the fire it became unfit to use for that 
purpose.'' 
Whitaker v. Holmes, supra, was an action for rent 
after the destruction of a building by fire. The court 
stated: 
"In the case at bar, there is no admission 
upori the part of the lessee that he leased any-
thing more than the store building, but, on the 
contrary, the testimony of Holmes is direct and 
positive to the effect that he did not use any part 
of the lot upon which the building stood not 
covered by the building. He did not .pay any 
rent after the building was destroyed because 
he did not feel that he owed it after the building 
was destroyed.'' 
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The court quoted the common la-\v rule contended 
for by plaintiffs herein from the ease of B'uerger v. Boyd, 
:23 ~-\rk. 4-1J, and then quoh's as follows: 
''If one siinply leases the house or room, and 
acquires no control over, or interest in, the soil, 
and the building be destroyed, we understand the 
rule to be other·wise. '' 
The court then continued as follows : 
"\Ve are convinced that the facts of this 
record sho\v that the consideration of the lease 
under reYiew was for the store building alone. 
\Yhen the building, therefore, was destroyed by 
fire, the consideration for the contract failed, and 
the appellee Holmes was no longer obligated to 
pay rent on the premises." 
The court quoted the usual contract rule from 6 
A.R.C.L., Page 1005, Section 369, and from 13 O.J .. , 
Page 643, Section 718, to the effect that the lease agree-
ment in such case as this is on the basis of the continued 
existence of the subject matter of the contract. 
In Saylor v. Brooks, supra, the tenant brought an 
action for failure by the landlord to rebuild a building. 
The lease providing that landlord agreed to keep the 
building in good repair. The court discussed the rule 
of the liability of a tenant for rent, and the court quotes 
from TVhitaker v. IlauJ·ley as follows: 
''The fact is, the parties negotiate for the 
possession of the building during the entire term. 
This underlies the whole thought of lease, just 
as fully as \vhen they negotiate for the hiring of 
a hor~.P. or a steamboat, or any other chattel. If 
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fire is thought of, it will be mentioned, and, if it 
is not mentioned, it is because it is not thought 
of, and because they are negotiating for a mu-
tually understood coterminous occupation and 
rent. Now to ignore these facts, which actually 
underlie the contract and are the very basis upon 
which it is made, will practically work out inju:-;-
tice, no matter how beautiful and symmetrical 
the legal structure we erect thereon. * * * Again;; 
in almost every other contract, these underlying 
facts are recognized, and modify the letter to 
accomplish the intent. Thus, in the hiring of 
chattels, though the terms be as absolute and 
positive as those of a real estate lease, their 
absolute destruction without the fault of the 
hirer terminates the contract. It is assumed that 
the contract only lasts and the obligation to pay 
for the use continues only while the property 
remains in being, and not until the end of' the: 
term named in the contract. Anything which in-
volves the substantial destruction of the chattel 
·puts an end to the obligations of either party in 
reference to it. * * * So if the hiring is of a room 
or rooms in a building, destruction of the build-
ing by fire puts an end to the lease (citing cases.) '' 
We will now consider some of the cases which hold 
that where there is a substantial destruction of the 
portion of the building leased, the lease hold estate is 
gone and the relationship of landlord and tenant ter-
minated. 
In Womach v. McQuarry, supra, the plaintiff owned 
a saw mill and a woolen factory which were side hy 
side. Plaintiff leased to the defendant the entire saw 
mill and one room of the factory to the defendant. Both 
buildings were destroyed by fire. The court held that 
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the defendant was liable for rent on the saw mill but 
not on the room in the factory. Thus, this case clearly 
presents the application of the harsh common law rule 
and the exception thereto. The court recognizes the 
existence of the common law rule and then further as 
follows: 
•' There are, hmYeYer, some comparatively re-
cent cases in which an exception to this rule has 
been held to exist * * * This exception applies 
only to cases where the demise is a part of an 
entire building, as a cellar or an upper room, and 
it is founded upon the idea that in such cases it 
is not the intention of the lease to grant any in-
terest in the land, save for the single purpose of 
the enjoy1nent of the apartment demised, and 
that zclzen that enjoyment becomes impossible by 
reason of the destruction of the building, there 
remains nothing upon which the demise can 
operate.'' 
In Harring/on v. Watson, supra, the court, after 
recognizing the common la'v rule, stated: 
''The authorities, however, indicate that there 
is an exception to this rule that the distinction 
of a building does not discharge the liability of 
the tenant for rent where the lease is of an upper 
story or basement or apartment in a building, 
because in such cases, they say, it is not the 
interest of the lease to grant any interest in the 
land further than is necessary for the enjoyment 
of the rooms so demised, and when these are de-
stroyed, there is nothing upon which the lease 
can operate. The lease terminates with the estate. 
"If, 'the room on the corner' etc., was the 
thing leased, and when the principal thing leased 
was destroyed, the lessee's interest therein neces-
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sarily terminated. The fire dissolved the r~la­
tion of landlord and tenant, for there was nothing 
left to hold in tenancy~ The thing rented was 
gone, destroyed by fire, and as a consequence, 
the lease terminated.'' 
In Waite v. Oneil, supra, the plaintiff brought an 
action for rent of a "landing" on the Mississippi River. 
A current washed away the landing leaving a vertical 
bluff of from 60 to 80 feet high. The court refers to 
the common law rule contended for by plaintiffs in the 
case at bar and then states: 
"The reason for this severe rule is that the 
land is deemed the subject of the demise, and the 
buildings mere incident. If the land remained to 
the tenant after the buildings were destroyed, he 
had a right to occupy and use it, his liability for 
rent, without abatement was held to continue* * * 
In view of the fact that rent is a compensation 
for the use of the thing demised, it has been re-
garded as a harsh rule and contrary to natural 
justice, that liability for rent should continue 
after the possibility of beneficial use had been 
destroyed by accident, and at an early day some 
of the judges struggled over its severity * * * 
These early efforts to mitigate it were unavailing~ 
and the rule was finally settled as stated. * * '" 
But the very foundation upon which the old rnlt~ 
was vested is removed if the subject matter of 
the demise is destroyed. This exception is noticed 
by Justice May in his statement of the common 
law rule in Viterbo v. Freedlander (120 N.S. 707, 
7 S. Ct. 962), when he adds, "unless at least the 
injury is such a destruction of the land as to 
amount to an eviction.'' Where the subject matter 
of the lease is a room or an apartment in a build-
ing, and the building is destroyed, the lease !s 
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terminated, the interest of the tenant is at an end, 
and the covenant to pay rent extinguished. This 
rule is bottomed upon the fact that under such 
leases it is to be presumed that the interest of 
the tenant in the subjacent land was to continue 
only so long as the subject matter of the lease 
existed * * * it has never been repudiated or 
questioned in cases where it is applicable, so far 
as our researches have extended and has been 
applied in Inany well reasoned cases.'' 
The court applied the exception in favor of the 
defendant and denied the plaintiff recovery for rent and 
In so doing stated: 
"In the case at bar, we have already deter-
mined that the subject matter of this lease was. 
the landing, as it existed at the date of the lease. 
A 'landing' implies a place where vessels can be 
moored and loaded or discharged. The landing 
was effectually destroyed by the ravages of the 
river." 
This well established exception to the common law 
rule is applicable to the case at bar by the very terms 
of the lease, the only thing leased is: ''The West one 
hundred forty-five feet (145') of that certain building 
known as building number one eighty one (181) located_ 
at 1710 South Redwood Road." In considering whether 
or not there has been a circumstantial destruction of 
the building, we must take into consideration the pur-
pose for which the building ·was leased. As indicated 
in the statement of the case, all parties concerned kne;.-:a: 
of the purpose for \Yhich the portion of the building 
was rented. That purpose was for the storage of large 
lleayy rolls of newsprint. A sizeable portion of the 
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flooring collapsed. Upon the happening of that event, 
certainly the defendant could not continue the use of 
the building for the storage of these heavy rolls. It 
had been indicated by the collapse a reasonable person 
would conclude that he should remove the heavy weight 
from the flooring. No determination could be safely 
made that the rest of the flooring had not been weakened 
in some way because of the elements or because of the 
weight placed upon the floor. In other words, the build-
ing had become valueless for the purpose for which it 
had been rented. The use and enpoyment of these 
premises by the defendant was at an end. That such is 
the rule to be followed is indicated by the case of Coogan 
v .. Pa.rker, supra, wherein the court stated at Page 679 
of 16 Am. Rep.: 
'' * * * the construction of all deeds must be 
made with reference to the subject matter." 
The court again stated at Page 680 : 
"The ground of destruction must be the fact 
that the structure bears such relation, in point of 
fitness and value for the use contemplated by the 
lease, as to give rise to the conclusion that the 
buildings were the main element of consideration 
on which the agreement to pay rent was based." 
This is also indicated by the underlined portion of 
the quotation from Waite v. Oneil, supra, as follows: 
"Unless at least the injury is such a destruction of the 
land as to amount to an eviction." An eviction take8 
place when the use and enjoyment of the premises is 
materially interfered with. It does not require a total 
and complete expulsion. C. Silberstein v. Larbovit2. 
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(Tex.). :200 8.\Y. 2d 647; Giraud v. illilovitch, 29 Cal. 
..:\pp. 543, 83 P. :2d 18:2. 
Destruction does not mean complete annihilation, 
destruction is harm that substantially affects the value 
of the thing. Following· the rule stated in the restate-
ment of the law of torts, section 221, relating to per-
sonal property as follows : This is the holding of 
Roberts u .. Commercial Casualty Company, 168 Fed. 2d 
:23. 
Following the analogy of the contractural rule re-
quiring continued existence of the subject matter of the 
contract, the court, in Calechman v. Great Atlantic and 
Pacific Tea Company, held that the obligation to pay 
rent becomes absolute only by use and enjoyment of the 
property and upon deprivation of right by unavoidable 
accident or contingency of like nature, the tenant's lia-
bility for rent only extends to that time. 
The court in Taylor v. Hart, supra, the court stated: 
"Rent is compensation for the use and implies 
the continued existency of the property to be 
used.'' 
That there was such destruction of the portion of 
the building as to relieve defendant from rent is indi-
cated by the case of Leonard v. Armstrong, 73 :Mich. 577, 
41 ~.\Y. 695, wherein the defendant rented a house for 
dwelling purposes and moved out after he was unable 
to heat the house and the plumbing fixtures permitted 
sen•rl' gas to permeate the house. The court stated: 
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"If, as defendant contends, from the defects 
in the construction of the house, it became un-
tenantable and unfit for habitation, he was not 
compelled to keep it and pay rent; or if, from 
defects in plumbing, of which he was not advised 
when making the lease, sewer gas escaped, and 
his family became sick from such causes, and the 
home became untenantable and unfit for habita-
tion from such causes, he was not compelled to 
keep the premises and pay rent. He rented the 
premises for a dwelling for his family, believing, 
as it appears, that the premises were tenantable 
and fit for the purposes for which he rented them. 
After remaining in them he found them unfit for 
the purposes for the causes above-mentioned and 
moved out.'' 
In Hazard Bank and Trust Company v. Hazard 
Mercantile Company, 220 Ken. 165, 294 S.W. 1034, the 
court stated: 
''The uncontradicted evidence shows that only 
walls or parts of the walls were left standing. 
That this amounted to a ·practical destruction of 
the building for storeroom purposes there call 
be no doubt, and the court did not err in refusing 
to submit the question to the jury." 
We submit then, that under the foregoing authori-
ties, the collapse of the floor under the circumstances 
existing in this case and in view of the fact that the only 
purpose in the leasing of the premises was to store 
heavy materials, there was a practical and circumstan-
tial destruction of the subject matter of the lease. 
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XO APPLICATION OF PAROLE EVIDENCE RULE 
'Ye are not here seeking to enforce any covenant 
against the plaintiffs and hence the parole evidence rule 
has no application. This is merely an application of 
the rules concerning the construction of a contract that 
is the lease agreement between the parties to determine 
whether or not plaintiffs are entitled to recover. Under 
these rules of construction, it clearly appears that 
plaintiffs are not entitled to recover any rentals in this 
action. 
Let us hasten to say that the defendant is not 
relying upon any warranties in its defense of- this ac-
tion, and did not introduce said testimony for the pur-
pose of varying the terms of the written contract. 
It is our contention that the testimony was compe-
the intentions of the parties in relation to covenants 
tent and material in assisting the court in ascertaining 
and limitations of liability under the exceptions set 
forth in the lease. The rule appears to be well settled 
that a view of the circumstances connected with the 
making of the lease will materially assist the court In 
ascertaining the meaning of the contracting parties. 
In the case of Machen, et al. v. Hooper, et al., 21 
Atlantic Reporter 67, the lessors owned a warehouse 
which they desired to rent. The lessees desired for the 
prosecution of their business just such a warehouse as 
this one was supposed to be. In commenting upon the 
circumstances connected with the n1aking of this leasP, 
in ascertaining the meaning of the contracting parties 
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and the limitation of liability under the exceptions set 
forth in said lease, the court said : 
"The jury had a right to consider the purpose 
for which the warehouse was built, and for which 
it had been used, and also its apparent strength 
and storage capacity, and the business in which 
the defendants were engaged when they rented 
it, and to find, whether, as men of ordinary pru-
dence and sagacity, they were justified in believ-
ing that it was strong enough to bear the weight 
of the goods which they stored in it. It is not in 
the ordinary course of business to require tenants 
to make the examination mentioned in this prayer. 
The defendants rented the warehouse for the 
prosecution of their business. They and their 
business were known to one of the plaintiffs, and 
it must have been known that they intended to 
use the warehouse for such proper purposes as 
their business required. The ,plaintiffs' seventh 
prayer proceeds on the theory that, if the build-
ing fell because of the weight of the goods stored 
in it, or of the manner in which they were stored, 
the defendants were liable. It does not leave to 
the jury the inquiry whether the weight of the 
goods was unreasonable and excessive, or whether 
they were stored in a cautious, prudent, and skill-
ful manner. These inquiries were indispensable, 
unless the defendants are to be understood a::; 
contracting that they would abstain from a rea-
sonable use of the building for the purposes to 
which it was apparently adapted. There must be 
some limitation to their liability of injurie~ 
caused by their own act. If a warehouse, to all 
appearance strong and stable, should in reality 
be so infirm as to fall down when the most ordi-
nary operations of business are going on with 
care and prudence within its walls, it would not 
be just to say that the fall was caused by thr 
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tenant's conduct. Before we can convict the 
tenant of inflicting such an injury, we must find 
that he did something which he ought not to have 
done; that he subjected the building to an un-
reasonable strain; or that he was in some other 
way negligent, incautious, or regardless of duty. 
If a building should fall because it was too weak 
to endure legitimate use, it could not with pro-
priety be said that the injury was inflicted by a 
tenant who was ·prud~ntly and carefully making 
such legitimate use of it. 
In this case, the lease provided that at the end of 
the term, the defendants would quietly surrender to the 
lessors the said demised premises and building in the 
same good order and condition they were in at the time 
of the lease, ordinary wear and tear, loss by fire, (other 
than as hereinbefore especially provided against) act~ 
of God and damage caused by external accident or act:5 
of third parties. 
These same exceptions are embraced in the case 
at bar. In commenting upon the construction of this 
lease, the court said : 
''Certainly this rule of construction prevails 
in this state to the fullest extent. In very many 
cases it has been tacitly applied as a matter of 
course, without formal enunciation. Our decisions 
have been in full accord with the rule stated by 
the supreme court of the United States in Nash 
v. Towne, 5 \Yall. 699. It may answer a good 
purpose if we quote it: ''Courts, in the construc-
tion of contracts, look to the language employed, 
the subject-matter, and the surrounding circum-
stances. They are never shut out from the same 
light which the parties enjoyed when the con-
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tract was executed, and, in that view, they are 
entitled to place themselves in the same situation 
as the parties who made the contract~ so as to 
view the circumstances as they viewed them, and 
so to judge the meaning of the words, and to the 
things described.'' 
The conversations had between an employee of the 
Deseret News, one of the plaintiffs in the action, and 
two men who were to handle the storage of newsprint 
paper in the premises if they were found suitable. In 
these conversations, they discussed the age and char-
acter of the building, the use to which the building was 
to be put, the building was measured for heighth an!l 
the size and weights of the different rolls of paper wert~ 
divulged. They figured out the weights on a square foot 
basis. The ·plaintiffs had Rtored in its portion of the 
building brick tiling at an average load of 500 pounds 
per square foot, while the weight of the paper averaged 
from 320 to 331 pounds per square foot. That the 
reasonable use of the building was based upon that in-
formation and an inspection of the un ierstructure re-
vealed that the building was constructed on cement 
footings with vertical cement piers sustaining the fiool'> 
and that the soil was observed to be dry. 
In the case of Godman et al. v.- Hygrade Food Prod-
ucts Corporation of New York, 3 N.E. 2d 759, the court 
says: 
"In the application of phrases of such gen-
eral significance to a building which is the sub-
ject matter of a lease various things are to be 
taken into account. Among thes·e are the char-
acter of the building and of its original construe-
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tion, Judkins v. Charette, 255 Mass. 76, 82, 151 
N.E. 81, 45 A.L.R. 1; the use to which the build-
ing is to be put and the character of a business 
there to be carried on, Kaplan v. Flynn, 255 Mass. 
127, 130, 150 N .E. 872, 45 A.L.R. 6 ; the age of 
the building and its general capacity for use at 
the time the lease is given, Drouin v. Wilson, 80 
Yt. 335, 67 A. 825, 13 Ann. Cas. 93; St. Joseph & . 
St. Louis Railroad v. St. Louis, Iron Mountain & 
Southern Railway, 135 :Mo. 173, 36 S.W. 602, 33 
L.R.A. 607; Lehmaier v. Jones, 100 App. Div. 
495, 91 N.Y.S. 687; Lister v. Lane & Nesham, 
(1893) 2 Q.B. 212; Lurcott v. Wakly & Wheeler, 
(1911) K.B. 905, 916; and the class of tenant and 
the kind of business of a tenant who would be 
likely to lease the building, Miller v. McCardell, 
19 R.I. 304, 33 A. 445, 30 L.R.A. 682; Proudfoot 
v. Hart, 25 Q.E.D. 42." 
In the case of Harris v. Corliss Chapman and Drake, 
the defendants lease from plaintiffs for a term of years 
the first story and basement of a brick building in the 
City of St. Paul. Among other things, the lease provideJ 
that the tenant would not be liable for damage by the 
elements. 
''The court below found that during the term 
'the said basement became so damp and wet and 
unhealthy as to be untenantable, and unfit for 
use by the defendant in its business; that said 
premises were so rendered untenantable by 
springs of water percolating and oozing through 
and under the walls of said basement from the 
exterior of said building.' 
"The sole question is whether, upon these 
facts, the basement was rendered untenantable 
'by the elements,' within the meaning of the 
lease. The terms 'the elements,' and 'damages 
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by the elements,' are somewhat uncert~in a~d in-
definite expressions, and very little a1d· w1ll be 
derived from resorting to any technical or scien-
tific ·discussion of the meaning of the word 'ele-
ments.' We should rather look to see whether 
the word has received any fixed and accepted 
meaning in the language of leases, and take the 
contract by its four corners, and try to ascertain 
how such an expression would be ordinarily un-
derstood by conveyancers and business men. The 
expression 'by fire or the elements' occurs twice 
elsewhere in this lease. Immediately preceding 
the provision quoted is one to the effect that if 
the ·premises shall at any time during the term 
be rendered wholly untenantable 'by fire or the 
elements,' and the injured premises can be rebuilt 
or repaired within three months, then the lessor is 
to rebuild or repair, if the lessee shall so request, 
'within ten days after such occurrence;' otherwise 
such occurrence shall operate to terminate the 
lease. It is apparent that the expression, ''by fire 
or the elements,' is used in the same sense in 
both instances. The lease also contains a covenant 
on part of the lessee to surrender the premises 
at the expiration of the term in as good condition 
as the same were in when occupation under the 
lease began, usual wear and tear of reasonable 
and careful use thereof, 'and destruction thereof 
or injury thereto by fire or the elements, ex-
cepted.' We think, with the defendant, that the 
expression is here used also in the same sense. 
"The lease contains no covenant on part of 
the lessor to make repairs, exce-pt those above 
quoted, and hence he was not bound to do so, 
much less to make improvements or betterments; 
the policy of the law being to require the tenant, 
before he takes a lease, to examine the premises, 
and elect, once for all, whether they will suit his 
purposes. While the finding is silent upon the 
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subjt>et. it is fair to assume that the percolation 
of water into the basement was not the result 
of any extraordinary or unusual occurrence, 
such as a flood or freshet, or of any cause ori-
ginating subsequent to the demise, but was the 
natural result of a cause fully existing at and 
prior to the date of the lease, such as the wet 
or springy character of the soil on which the 
building was erected or that adjacent, or some 
inherent defect in the plan of its structure, as 
the lack of proper drains to carry off the water 
of the oozing springs. In such a case, although 
the existence of a wetter season of the year, yet 
the efficient cause existed at the date of the 
demise, and the results were but the natural and 
ordinary operations of the laws of nature." 
Of course, this case is easily distinguishable from 
the situation of that in the case at bar. In the present 
case, the records of the weather bureau show that on 
Saturday and Sunday, 42j100's of an inch of rain fell 
in that area accompanied by sudden thunder shower8 
and heavy down pour. This storm was a sudden, un-
usual and unexpected action of the elements in that it 
was figured out that thousands of gallons of water fell 
upon the roof and the platforms of the building, and a 
survey of the premises disclosed that the southwest 
corner was the lowest point underneath the building, 
and the testimony from expert witnesses who made sur-
veys of the premises was that it did drain from both 
an east and west direction into that low area. The 
court will undoubtedly take judicial notice of the fact 
that the annual precipitation in the State of Utah is 
only 13 7:2j100's inches per annum, and that this stornl 
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deposited over a period of 48 hours lj26th of the annual 
rainfall. 
The testimony of Mr. Wycoff, who went inside the 
building on Monday, September 20, the day after the 
floor collapsed, was that there was about 6 inches of 
water in the collapsed area, and that on account of 
the large amount of water, the ground had become so 
soft that he could and did ·push a broom handle without 
much exertion to a depth of 2 feet, far below the 
cement footings on which the structure rested. Natural-
ly, this sudden action of the elements, and the collectin~. 
of water, and the softening of the ground to an extent 
of 2 feet did weaken the cement understructure and 
permit the sinking of the footings as shown by the ex-
pert testimony of Mr. Ulrich to the extent that the 
floor was subject to a span of 20 feet instead of a 10 
foot span under which the building had been constructed. 
Mr. Ulrich figured out from scientific formulas that 
this additional strain on the timbers greatly increaset1 
the fiber stress far beyond the fracture stress and that 
consequently the floor collapsed. 
In the case of the Oakland Motor Car Company r. 
Rippey Motor Company, 154 S.E. 823, the court com-
mented on what constituted damage by the elements. In 
that case, plaintiff brought suit against defendant for 
rent of a certain building. There was no dispute made 
by the record as to the amount due for rent, but de-
fendant set up that during the period of the lease, a 
heavy wind storm prevailed in which the rented ·premise8 
were located; that the wind reached an ''unusual, 8l'Yrn· 
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: 
and dangerous Yelocity" on account of which, all or 
nearly all the plate-glass windows in the leased premises 
were blown out. The "·indows were repaired by the 
defendant at a stated cost and he made demand upon 
the plaintiff for reimbursement but had been refused. 
The court directed a. verdict for the plaintiff in the 
amount represented by the difference between the 
amount due for rent and the amount expended by the 
defendant in repairing the broken glass. 
"None of the cases cited by counsel, or which have 
been examined, indicate that a violent windstorm of un-
usual nature which could not be reasonably forseen or 
guarded against, resulted in damages, should not be 
deemed a casualty and it seems clear that the damages 
to the pia te-glass windows of the building leased in the 
instant case resulted in a casualty within the meaning of 
the contract", the court concluded. 
In conclusion, we contend that the defendant did 
not breach its coYenant under the lease; that the damage 
to the building was a result of sudden, unusual and un-
expected action of the elements; that the building was 
rendered untentable by reason of the damage thereto, 
and that defendant should be relived of any liability in 
this cause of action. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ROBERTS & ROBERTS 
Attorneys for Defendant 
39 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
